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1 Introduction
The collective management of water and other natural resources is increasingly
being recognised as a key determinant of economic performance, especially in the
rural sector of developing economies (Platteau, 1991; Balland and Platteau, 1996;
Ostrom, 2003; Bardhan et al., 2006). By its nature, collective action involves
interdependency among individuals.1 This, combined with the non-excludable
and rival nature of many natural resources, poses signicant challenges and raises
the question of whether individuals are capable to successfully manage resources
held in common.
Over the past decades, signicant advancements have been made in the col-
lective action literature and the earlier conventional wisdom that the users of
a common resource are inevitably trapped in a process leading to overuse and
degradation (Hardin 1968) is no longer regarded as the only relevant view. Using
multiple methods of analysis, scholars from di¤erent disciplines have shown that
the tragedy of the commons is not inevitable.2 Importantly, they have made
considerable progress in identifying the conditions that are most likely to inu-
ence the success of collective action and collective good provision. These include:
(i) users group characteristics, such as group size and heterogeneity; (ii) insti-
tutional arrangements; and (iii) physical attributes of common-pool resources
(Sandler, 1992; Agrawal, 2007; Ostrom, 2007). Yet, as suggested by Ostrom and
colleagues, advancing our understanding of collective action problems requires
1For example, the maintenance of an irrigation network requires the stabilization of the
rims and the cleaning of minor channels across farmers land. In this context, the e¤ort of
one farmer is likely to inuence the activity of other farmers along the network, thus implying
strategic interactions among individual users.
2Examples of collective behaviour have been identied in a wide range of contexts. These
include the management of sheries (e.g., Acheson, 2003; Singleton, 1999), forests (e.g., Mck-
ean, 1986, 2000; Schoonmaker Freudnberger 1993), pastures (e.g., Gilles et al. 1992; Netting,
1981; Nugent and Sanchez, 1999), and groundwater resources (e.g., Blomquist 1992; Trawick,
2003; Marchiori et al., 2012).
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further investigation of the relationships between these key dimensions, as well
as of broader contextual variables (Poteete et al., 2010).
This paper focuses on the mechanisms linking heterogeneity, institutions and
incentives within the context of water resources. Specically, it investigates
whether and how land inequality which is taken here as an exogenous source
of heterogeneity a¤ects the allocation rule that maximises the amount of water
collectively provided.3 In order to trace the fundamental trade-o¤s that relate
initial inequality to the optimal water allocation rule, we introduce a stylised
model in which two types of farmer, with unequal land endowments, can volun-
tarily contribute to a joint project for the maintenance of an irrigation network.
Maintenance activity increases the amount of water e¤ectively available. The
collective output (water) is then distributed according to some allocation rule
and used by each farmer in combination with land to produce a nal good.
We nd that the initial degree of inequality does a¤ect the optimal allocation
rule, and that the nature of such relationship depends on technological features
such as the complementarity between agents e¤orts in the realization of the
collective good. More precisely, we identify two key forces, which a¤ect the dis-
tribution of water in opposite directions. The rst force, which is referred to as
e¤ort-augmenting, seeks to maximise the aggregate level of e¤ort by pushing the
distribution of water towards the agent with the higher marginal return to water.
Due to the assumed complementarity between land and water in the production
3The paper approaches the problem from a non-cooperative perspective, by studying how
inequality and rules a¤ect agents incentives to contribute in a Nash equilibrium. This is
generally regarded as the natural starting point in this kind of analyses. A possible extension
for future research is to study the problem from a cooperative perspective. In a cooperative
setting, considerations of bargaining power become particularly important. This may require a
more explicit account of possible relationships between inequality and power. Other factors we
abstract from here, but may a¤ect cooperative decision-making include reciprocity and social
norms. The importance of such factors for the emergence of cooperative behaviours have been
shown, for example, by Bicchieri (2006) and, within an evolutionary-game-theoretic framework,
by Sethi and Somanathan (1996; 2003) and Noailly et al. (2007).
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of the nal good, this is the agent with the larger endowment of land. This
force is the prominent force when e¤orts are highly substitute. Typically, how-
ever, the production technology for the collective good displays some degree of
complementarity between agentse¤orts. In such cases, the e¤ort mix, alongside
with aggregate e¤ort, becomes critical for the level of collective good provision.
Hence, a second force kicks in, which seeks to correct the e¤ort-augmenting ef-
fect by distributing water so as to reach the optimal mix of e¤ort. As we will
show, this e¤ort-mixforce calls for more egalitarian or even progressive water
allocation rules.
The role of inequality has been much debated in the collective action litera-
ture, with theoretical works suggesting that inequality can have either positive
(Olson, 1965; Alix-Garcia, 2007), negative (Ostrom, 1990), non-linear (Dayton-
Johnson and Bardhan, 2002; Baland et al., 2007), or ambiguous (Baland and
Platteau, 1997; Bardhan et al., 2006) e¤ects on collective action. Much like
the theoretical work in this area, the results from econometric and experimental
studies are rather mixed with authors nding that inequality tends to reduce
public good provision (Bergstrom et al., 1986; Anderson et al., 2003), while oth-
ers report higher contributions (Chan et al., 1996; Cardenas, 2002; Cherry et al,
2003). A closer look at this wide range of results suggests that inequality often
interact with other factors - e.g., technological properties (Baland et al. 2007),
and the degree of publicness of the collective good in question (Bardhan et al.,
2006) - that may a¤ect the signof its impact.
One aspect that has emerged as critical from recent empirical analyses is the
relationship between inequality and institutions such as the rules that distribute
collective outcomes. Institutions may inuence the success with which a commu-
nity undertakes collective action by shaping agentsreturns from cooperation.
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The nature of the relationship between inequality and rules, however, is not
straightforward: in some studies (e.g., Dayton-Johnson 1999, 2000), allocation
rules that favour the rich are more frequently observed in communities charac-
terized by relatively high degrees of inequality, while in others relatively fairer
rules are observed in more unequal communities (Bardhan, 2000, and Khwaja
2001).
The forces identied in this paper and the way they depend on technological
features contribute to shed some light on the mechanisms linking inequality, rules
and incentives. The remaining of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2
illustrates the features of the model. Section 3.1 derives and discusses the main
results. Further discussion is provided in section 3.2, where a special case for the
production technology of the collective good is considered. Section 4 concludes.
2 Model setup
2.1 Denitions and assumptions
Consider two types of farmer: 1 and 2. Each type is endowed with an amount of
irrigable land li, with li > 0 and i = f1; 2g. Let l  l1+l2 denote the total amount
of land in the economy. Farmersendowments can then be dened as: l1 =  l
and l2 = (1 ) l, with  2 (0; 1). In the remainder of the paper, we normalize
l to one and assume  > 0:5. The two types can, therefore, be interpreted as the
representatives of two di¤erent farmer groups: large landowners (type 1), and
small landowner (type 2).
Farmers can voluntarily engage in a joint project for the maintenance of
a network of irrigation channels. Collective-maintenance activity increases the
supply of water available for irrigation. Better maintenance, for example, leads to
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lower losses from ltration, leakage and sedimentation. The output of the project,
Z, is represented by the average water ow delivered through the system and is
a function of farmerse¤orts: e1, e2. Specically, we parametrize the production
technology for Z by using a CES production function:4
Z = F (e1; e2) = [e

1 + e

2 ]
1
 (1)
where  < 1 measures the degree of complementarity between individual e¤orts.
Agentse¤orts are assumed to be unobservable (or not enforceable). The col-
lective output, Z, is divided among farmers according to some allocation rule
  = (1;2), where 1 and 2 are farmersshares in Z, with 1;2  0 and
1 + 2 = 1. When convenient, we will simplify the notation as follows: 1 = ,
2 = 1  .
The amount of water allocated to a farmer according to the allocation rule
  is given by zi = iZ with i = f1; 2g. Each agent uses two inputs, land and
water, to produce a nal good. Agent is payo¤ is dened as:
i = f(li; zi)  ei
where f(li; zi) is the individual production function for the nal good and ei is
is contribution for the maintenance of the irrigation network.
We assume that the cost of ei units of e¤ort is simply ei and that the pro-
4CES production functions cover the whole spectrum of substitution and complementarity
among e¤orts. For example, when the parameter  in Equation (1) tends to one, the pro-
duction technology for Z approximates a linear production function; as  approaches zero,
the isoquants of the CES looks like the isoquants of the Cobb-Douglas production function;
while in the limit case for  that approches ( 1), the CES function approximates a Leontiev
technology where e¤orts are perfect complements. Hence, although they impose a regularity in
the shape of isoquants, CES production functions allow considering a wide range of collective
action relevant to water resources - from small dam construction to channel maintenance and
pollution reduction activities, where the degree of complementarity among individual e¤orts is
progressively increasing.
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duction technology for the nal good is well represented by the following Cobb-
Douglas production function5
f(li; zi) = (zi)
 (li)
1  ; with  2 (0; 1)
From the complementarity between li and zi in (2), it follows that the mar-
ginal return to water is an increasing function of land.
Although the paper focuses on land inequality as the only source of hetero-
geneity, an alternative interpretation is possible, which views the parameter  as
capturing some characteristic of an agent, such as skills or locational di¤erences.
As long as these characteristics a¤ect the marginal productivity of water, this
alternative interpretation is consistent with the analysis.
2.2 Individual optimization problem
Each agent chooses the level of e¤ort that maximizes her own payo¤, given the
contribution made by the other. Specically, for any given expectation e2 about
the level of e¤ort exerted by agent 2, type 1 solves the following problem
max
e10
1 = f(l1; z1(e1; e2))  e1 =
h
(e1 + e

2 )
1

i
()1    e1
The rst-order condition is:
@1
@e1
= 0) ()()1 (Z) 1 @Z
@e1
  1 = 0 (3)
From (1), the derivative of Z with respect to e1 can be written as:
5Although specic, the Cobb-Douglas form has been widely used in economics because it
generally ts the data well. Moreover, it displays complementarity between land and water
as inputs of production, which seems a realistic feature of the production process for most
agricultural products.
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@Z
@e1
= (Z)1 (e1) 1. (4)
By substituting (4) into (3) and upon some calculation, we have:6
(e1)
 = ()

1   ()()1  1   (Z)( )1  (5)
Similarly, one can dene type 2s optimization problem and obtain:
(e2)
 = ()

1   (1  )(1  )1  1   (Z)( )1  (6)
By substituting (5) and (6) into equation (1) and rearranging the terms, the
following expression for Z can be derived:
Z = 
n
()()1 

+

(1  )(1  )1 o (7)
where   () 11  ,   
1  and   1 (1 ) .7 Equation (7) represents the amount
of collective output produced in equilibrium.8
6Using (4), we can write equation (3) as follows:
()()1 (Z) 1(Z)1 (e1) 1   1 = 0
That is
()()1 (Z) (e1) 1 = 1
which leads to
e1
 1 =

()()1 (Z) 
 1
Raising both side to the power of =(   1), we have
e1
 =

()()1 (Z) 
 
1 
which is equivalent to equation (5). The same step-by-step derivation applies to equation
(6) once we have changed the index of the player from 1 to 2 in the maximisation problem.
7Notice that ,  and  are only well dened if  6= 1 and  6= 1, which will be assumed in
the reminder of the paper.
8It can be shown that there exists another solution which involves ei = 0 for all i. This,
however, will be disregarded, as it implies Z = 0. The analysis will, instead, focus on the
non-trivial equilibrium in which the collective output is positive.
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3 Results
3.1 Inequality and Rules
In this section, we start by identifying the distribution of water that maximises
the collective output produced in equilibrium, and then proceed to analyse how
that is a¤ected by inequality in initial conditions - as represented by  > 0:5.
The problem can be expressed as follows:
max
01
Z = 
n
()()1 

+

(1  )(1  )1 o . (8)
If a solution interior to the interval [0,1] exists, then the following FOC must
hold:
@Z
@
=

1   
n
()()1 

+

(1  )(1  )1 o 1  (9)
()( 1)()(1 )  (1  )( 1)(1  )(1 )	
= 0
Notice that, for  2 (0; 1) and  2 (0; 1) the rst two terms in (9) are strictly
positive.
Condition (9) can, therefore, be simplied as follows:

()( 1)()(1 )
  (1  )( 1)(1  )(1 ) = 0 (10)
By substituting for  = 
1  and solving with respect to , we obtain:
 =

 + (1  ) (11)
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where:   (1 )
(1  ) .
It can be shown that for  < 1
1+
the maximization problem in (8) admits the
interior solution derived above. Equation (11) can be interpreted as a weighted
index of the degree of inequality characterizing the economy. More precisely,
inequality in land distribution is weighted by the parameter , which is a function
of two elements: (i) the strategic importance of agentse¤orts in the realization
of the collective good   as measured by ; and (ii) the relative importance of
water compared to land in the production of the nal good   as measured by .
From (11), the derivative of  with respect to  is:
@
@
=
  [(1  )] 1
 + (1  )2 (12)
with   (1 )
(1  ) .
Given  2 (0; 1), the sign of @
@
in (12) is the same as the sign of . Moreover,
within the range of parameter values  < 1
1+
, the sign of  varies as follows:
 < 0 for  < 0; and  > 0 for  2  0; 1
1+

. We show in the appendix that,
for  2   1
1+
; 1

, Z is still increasing in  at the value  = 1. In this case, the
supply of irrigation water is maximized by setting  = 1 for any  > 0:5.9
Hence, the relationship between inequality and rules can be summarized as
follows:
 For  < 0) @
@
< 0;
 For  2  0; 1
1+
) @
@
> 0;
 For  2   1
1+
; 1
)  = 1, 8 > 0:5:
9The appendix also shows that the other possible corner solution,  = 0, can never be a
global maximum for any   0:5.
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For  < 0   that is, as one moves towards relatively high degree of comple-
mentarity between agentse¤orts  the collective output is maximized by allocat-
ing a relatively larger share of water to the small landowner. The opposite holds
within the interval  2  0; 1
1+
   that is, for lower degrees of complementarity.
In this case, assigning more water to the large landowner favours the provision of
the collective good and the share of the large landowner increases as inequality
in land holding becomes more pronounced. Finally, when agentscontributions
display relatively high degrees of substitutability   that is for  2   1
1+
; 1
  
the supply of irrigation water is maximized by allocating all the water available
to the large landowner, independently of the degree of inequality in landholding
(i.e., for any  > 0:5).
How can these results be interpreted? In the context of the present analysis,
it is possible to identify two key forces which a¤ect the distribution of water
in opposite directions. We refer to the rst force as e¤ort-augmenting. This
force pushes the distribution of water towards the agent with the higher marginal
return to water in the attempt to maximise the aggregate level of e¤ort. Due
to the complementarity between land and water in the production of the nal
good, this is the agent with the larger endowment of land. The e¤ort-augmenting
force is the prominent force when the production technology for the collective
good displays relatively high degrees of substitutability among agents e¤orts
(i.e. for strictly positive values of ). However, collective activities associated
with the management of water resources generally display some complementarity
in e¤orts. In the presence of complementarity, aggregate e¤ort is not all that
matters; indeed, the e¤ort mix is also important. Inequality may hamper the
achievement of the optimal e¤ort-mix (with negative consequences on collective
output) because it reduces the incentives to contribute of the small landowner.
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Hence, a second force kicks in, which seeks to correctfor this by distributing
water in a more progressive manner so as to reach the optimal mix of e¤ort. For
su¢ cient complementarity ( < 0), this e¤ort-mixforce tends to dominate.10
The use of water as an incentive mechanism has consequences that might
seem at rst glance counterintuitive in that it implies allocating more water to
the agent with lower marginal returns. This, however, may still represent the
constrainedoptimum when other contracting possibilities are not available, as
in the context considered here where e¤ort is unobservable. Furthermore, in some
institutional settings contracting over output may also be di¢ cult due to lack of
commitment on the part of the producers or to limited enforcement capacity on
the part of governmental authorities.11
3.2 Collective production function: A special case
This section discusses a special case for the production technology of the collective
good, which generates an interesting result as far as the interaction between
inequality and rules is concerned. Specically, we assume that the production
technology for Z is well represented by the following Cobb-Douglas production
function with constant returns to scale:12
10Applications of a similar idea can be found in the case study literature in relation to other
forms of heterogeneity. In some villages in Nepal, for instance, institutional arrangements have
been used to moderate the e¤ects of locational heterogeneity on usersincentives to monitor and
maintain their resources, by allowing more distant members to pay lower fees in exchange for
more time spent in monitoring and maintenance work (Varughese and Ostrom, 2001; Adhikari
et al., 2004; Adhikari and Di Falco, 2009).
11For simplicity, the model proposed in this paper assumes that output is deterministic.
However, in the rural sector of developing economies, output tends to be highly sensitive to
idiosincratic shocks. This, in turn, gives room to opportunistic behaviour by the parties - who
might have an incentive to cheat about the amount of output being produced - thus adding
further di¢ culties to the possibility of contracting over output.
12As explained in section 2, this can be thought of as a limit case of the CES production
function.
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Z = F (e1; e2) = e

1e
(1 )
2 (13)
with  2 (0; 1).
Type 1s maximization problem can be written as follows:
max
e10
1 = (Z)
 ()1    e1
The FOC for the above problem is given by:
@1
@e1
= 0)  ()()1  (Z) 1  @Z
@e1
  1 = 0 (14)
From (13), the derivative of Z with respect to e1 is:
@Z
@e1
= e1
( 1)e2(1 ) (15)
By substituting (15) into (14) and solving with respect to e1, the following
reaction function can be derived:
e1(e2) =
h
(1 )e(1 )2
i1=(1 )
Similarly, from type 2s maximization problem we have:
e2(e1) =

(1  )(1  )(1  )(1 )e1
1=[1 (1 )]
Solving the system of farmersreaction functions, the following equilibrium
levels of e¤ort can be obtained:

e1 = g
( 1 (1 )1  )
1  g2(
(1 )
1  ); e2 = g
( 1 )
1  g2(
1 
1  )

(16)
13
where: g1  (1 ), and g1  (1  )(1  )(1  )(1 ).
The collective output produced in equilibrium is:
Z = (e1)
 (e2)
(1 ) = g
( 1 )
1  g(
1 
1 )
2 (16)
The allocation scheme that maximizes the provision of the collective good is
given by the rule  that solves the following equation:
@Z
@
= 0)

1
1  



g
( 1 )
1  g(
1 
1 )
2





  (1  )
1  

= 0 (17)
Note that (17) is not well dened for  = 0 and  = 1. In what follows,
we assume  2 (0; 1). Under this assumption, the rst term in (17) is strictly
positive since the parameters ,  and  vary within the interval (0; 1). Condition
(17) can, therefore, be simplied as follows:


  (1  )
1   = 0 (18)
From (18), we have:  = . Thus, collective output is maximised by allo-
cating water according to farmersmarginal productivity of e¤ort (MPE). This
would imply equal distribution of water when MPE is identical across farmers.
The Cobb-Douglas production technology, hence, leads to a special case in which
the two forces identied in section 3.1 perfectly o¤set one another and the allo-
cation rule  is independent of the degree of inequality in land-holding.
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4 Conclusions
This paper focused on collective action problems associated with the management
of water resources at the local level. Specically, it considered a situation in which
two types of farmer, with unequal land endowments, can voluntarily engage
in collective maintenance activities to enhance the amount of water available.
Water is distributed according to some allocation rule and used by each farmer
as an input of production in combination with land. Within this context, we
investigated the relationship between land inequality and water allocation rules,
by determining whether and how the former a¤ects the distribution of water that
maximises collective good provision.
We found that two opposing forces are at work. The logic behind the rst
force (e¤ort-augmenting) is to maximise the aggregate level of e¤ort. In the
attempt to do so, such force pushes the distribution of water towards the agent
with the higher marginal return to water. The complementarity between land
and water in the production of the nal good implies that the marginal return
to water increases with land; consequently, the rst force works in favour of the
large landowner. The second force (e¤ort-mix) seeks to allocate water so as to
reach the optimal mix of e¤ort and calls instead for more egalitarian or even
progressive water allocation rules.
The trade-o¤ between these two forces depends on technological features of
the problem. Specically, the rst force is the prominent force when the produc-
tion technology for the collective good is characterised by relatively high degrees
of substitutability among e¤orts. In this case, the allocation rule that max-
imises collective output is such that a larger share of water is assigned to the
large landowner and the share of the large landowner increases with the degree
15
of inequality in land-holding. This result is in line with the Olsons argument -
namely, inequality may favour collective good provision by enhancing the interest
of the richest agent. However, this is not generally the case when the production
technology for the collective good displays (as it typically does) some degree of
complementarity. In particular, for su¢ cient complementarity we found that the
e¤ort-mix e¤ect becomes relatively more important and so does the second force;
in this case, more egalitaria or even progressive rules perform better in terms of
collective good provision.
Although the paper focused on land inequality (measured by the exogenous
parameter lambda), an alternative interpretation is possible that views lambda as
capturing some characteristic of an agent, such as skills or locational di¤erences.
As long as these characteristics a¤ect the marginal productivity of water, this
alternative interpretation is consistent with the analysis.
There are several avenues along which to extend the present work. Here,
we focused on the class of linear sharing rules; indeed, although the amount of
water that each player receives depends on aggregate water output, the shares
per se do not. The analysis of more general classes of mechanisms, where the
shares may also vary with the level of output, could provide further insights. The
paper examines how inequality and rules a¤ect agentsincentives to contribute
in a Nash-equilibrium; that is, it concentrates on the non-cooperative case. A
second extension could be to study the problem from a cooperative perspective.
In a cooperative setting, considerations of bargaining power become particularly
important; this may require a more explicit account of possible relationships
between inequality and power. Finally, it would be interesting to test the pre-
dictions of the model in laboratory or even eld experiments; this could enrich
the experimental literature on the subject by providing new insights and inter-
16
pretations. For example, experiments based on linear public good games could
be extended to account for the possibility that agents e¤orts display varying
degrees of complementarity, and heterogeneity a¤ects the marginal benets from
contributing through the relationship between private and collective inputs.
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Appendix
In the context of the present analysis,  is the solution to the following maxi-
mization problem:
max
01
Z = 
n
()()1 

+

(1  )(1  )1 o (a:1)
where   () 11  ,   
1  and   1 (1 ) .
By substituting for  = 
1  , the FOC for the above problem can be expressed
as follows:
()(

1  1)  () (1 )1    (1  )( 1  1)  (1  ) (1 )1  = 0 (a:2)
Condition (a:2) is implicitly assuming that the solution to (a:1) is interior
to the interval [0; 1]. However, the maximum may well be a corner solution. In
other words, it may well be:  = 1 and/or  = 0. This appendix will show
whether and under what conditions those limit values for  could represent a
solution to (a:1).
Consider rst  = 1. This will be a maximum if @Z

@
> 0 when  approaches
one. In that case, Z would still be increasing in  at the value  = 1.
Notice that, when the exponent of (1   ) in equation (a:2) is negative, it
cannot be true that  = 1, because:

1     1 < 0) lim!1(1  )
( 1  1) = lim
!1
1
(1  )(1  1  )
=1
Hence,
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lim
!1
"
1
()(1 

1  )
 () (1 )1    1
(1  )(1  1  )
 (1  ) (1 )1 
#
=  1
violating the FOC.
For  < 1
1+
, the magnitude
 

1    1

is negative, and the solution to (a:1)
is, therefore, given by equation (11).
For  > 1
1+
, we have:

1     1 > 0) lim!1(1  )
( 1  1) = 0
Therefore:
lim
!1
h
()(1 

1  )  () (1 )1    (1  )(1  1  )  (1  ) (1 )1 
i
= ()
(1 )
1  > 0
which, in turn, implies that for any  > 1
1+
, Z is maximised by setting  = 1.
Consider now the limit case  = 0. It is easy to prove that this can never be
a global maximum within the compact set [0; 1]. Let:
Z0  Z( = 0) = ()
1
1  
h
(1  ) (1 )1 
i 1 
(1 )
= ()
1
1   (1  )
and
Z1  Z( = 1) = ()
1
1  
h
()
(1 )
1 
i 1 
(1 )
= ()
1
1   
For  > 0:5   as it was assumed in section 3   it is straightforward to observe
19
that Z0 < Z1. Then,  = 0 cannot be a global maximum for  2 [0; 1], since
there exists at least one value of  2 [0; 1] such that Z() > Z0:
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